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BRITISH AND AMERICAN NAVAL EXPENDITURE.

BY LIEUTENANT CARLYON BELLAIRS, R.N.

WE live in an age of mutual insurance, when nations avoid disasters by limiting their liabilities. Risks cannot be avoided, but they can be minimized. To paraphrase a famous saying of Disraeli's, it is the business of statesmen to prevent by policy what war might otherwise effect by force. If there are times when it is wise for diplomacy to remember the maxim of Pascal, that most of the evils of life arise through inability to sit still, there are also tides in the affairs of nations as well as men which, taken at the flood, lead on to success. It is thus Great Britain justifies the Anglo-Japanese agreement. This temporary alliance was an assurance of mutual support so as to prevent the risk of either Power being attacked by more than one hostile nation over a question connected with the future of China or Korea. The essence of a limited alliance is to safeguard the future in peace or war, so that the military forces of both Powers are not called upon to act unless one or the other should be in danger of a great defeat. The abandonment of British claims in Korea had removed a stumbling-block to Anglo-Japanese co-operation. In a similar manner the settlement of the Alaskan boundary question, and the concessions made by Great Britain over the Panama Canal, have considerably improved the relations of Great Britain and the United States. Japan and Great Britain found a common policy in Chinese questions, even as the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race have found one in certain points of International Law, such as the determination that food is not to be regarded as contraband, unless shown, before a lawfully constituted prize-court, to be probably destined for the enemy's armed forces. It is recognized by American statesmen

that they can no longer remain indifferent to questions of oversea trade, now that the value of American exports and imports has risen to over \$2,500,000,000. Of \$1,400,000,000 of exports in 1903, the United States sent over \$700,000,000 to the British Empire, as compared with \$77,000,000 for France and \$19,000,000 for China. On the other hand, Great Britain cannot do without American foodstuffs and cotton; while the future development of the Empire will largely depend upon American capital. This growing interdependence is significant.

The Anglo-Japanese agreement was signed on January 30th, 1902, because, as stated therein, of "the desire that their common policy should find expression in an international contract of binding validity." After January 30th, 1907, one year's notice may be given of the termination of the treaty. This is a distinct flaw, for it takes over two years to build a battle-ship; and, since the cessation of the alliance means a loss of battle-ship power, the notice required should have been about three years, to enable either nation to augment her naval force. So far as the restraint and conduct of the Japanese are concerned, the confidence of Great Britain has been merited; but it is unlikely that the treaty will be renewed, for it may stand in the way of harmonious relations with the United States, which should naturally be one of the highest ideals of British policy. The risks taken by Great Britain were considerable, owing to the reckless ambitions of the Czar's advisers and the closeness of the ties binding France to Russia. Even so, the authors of the treaty may claim that it kept the conflict within measurable bounds. The Japanese were able to concentrate their whole force on the supreme task of driving the Russians from South Manchuria, as all probability of the sea communications of their army being cut by the navy of France or Germany was discounted by the potential strength of the British fleets in the Mediterranean and Channel. Japanese statesmen were well aware that, given adequate training, their naval operations could be forecasted with as much probability as any business which engages the attention of mankind. Though their naval forces were quite inadequate, if material strength were the only factor to be weighed, it is certain that they did not lose sight of the fact that the Russian Admiralty were attempting a well-nigh impossible feat in endeavoring to train a navy on four months' instruction in the year. It

was evident that the Russian administration was corrupt, and that its foreign policy was not coordinated to the defensive organization, in that its war preparations only matured in 1907, while diplomacy required military assistance in 1904. Just as sea-power was the indispensable condition of the operations of the allies in the Crimea, and of the British army in South Africa, so it has been with the Japanese in this war. If ever, at some future date, the United States should desire to prevent European nations from attacking Brazil or menacing American interests in Syria and China, it could only be effectively done by the use of sea-power previously built up with the most careful forethought and expenditure during a long period of peace. A good example will be found in the German Navy Bill of 1900, involving an additional expenditure during twenty years of nearly \$460,000,000. Every detail of the expansion, repair and replacement of ships, men and dockyards, was thought out in advance for each year with due regard to the capacity of the country to bear the expenditure.

That mere population and riches are no match in war against such careful organization, we have seen in the case of Russia. It is only the knowledge that the sea-barrier is impenetrable which will effectually prevent the expanding Teutonic, Slavonic and Latin races of Europe from contemplating aggression on the American continent. If unable to do so singly, nothing but sea-power will prevent them from trying to effect their purpose in combination. They have combined in the past for the partition of Poland. By the Russian declaration of February 26th, 1780, Russia, France, Spain, Holland, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark combined to resist the right of search, and the same Powers were acting together against Great Britain over this question in 1800. In 1807, Great Britain had to break Napoleon's compulsory alliance, framed by the treaty of Tilsit, by seizing eighteen Danish and eight Portuguese battle-ships, and by blockading the Russian battle-ships. Thus a fresh union of over 140 battle-ships was nipped in the bud, but such decisive action could not have been taken had not Great Britain been in the plenitude of her naval strength with 212 battle-ships. We learn that, within a period of twenty-seven years, there were three European alliances of three or more Great Powers against Great Britain, and all were broken up by the operations of sea-power.

France, Germany and Russia combined in 1895 to drive Japan out of China, for what they believed to be their own ultimate benefit; and we know that armed interference was meditated in the American-Spanish war of 1898. If it were urged that the rivalries of Slav and Teuton prevent an effective combination, I might instance from history cases in which statesmen of different nations have thought it the lesser evil to divert a struggle between their countries by exaggerating the mutual difficulties or temptations in another direction. It is sufficient for the present to mention the case of Frederick the Great, who, in 1769, wrote that "Russia is a terrible Power. . . . I foresee no other remedy than in time forming a league of the Great Powers to resist this dangerous torrent." In 1772, he preferred to cooperate with Russia in the first dismemberment of Poland.

It is in their strategical aspects that naval combinations are to be feared, for they cause the dispersion of the enemy's fleets in order to protect interests which are menaced by the ships of each party to the combination. Tactically, where allied fleets have been combined, they have never been nearly as dangerous as the mere total material force might suggest. Thus, strategically, so great was the dispersion of British battle-ships brought about in 1779 and 1780 by the alliance of the United States, France, Spain and Holland that, on occasions, though Great Britain possessed 133 battle-ships in 1779 and 145 in 1780, she was only able to oppose thirty-six battle-ships in the Channel to sixty-six in the allied fleets of France and Spain, and in 1780 only twenty-one to forty-nine of the allies. Yet so great is the tactical weakness of allied fleets that her opposition was successful. The instability of European alliances is another cause of want of vigor in battle; in the wars from 1793 to 1814, Russia changed sides three times. Again, when Spain "assisted" Great Britain at Toulon, she prevented the complete overthrow of the French naval power; because it was not to the interest of Spain that France should be unduly weakened. Such a consideration could not appeal to an Anglo-Saxon alliance. In addition, it should be mentioned that tactical weakness is much less obvious where language and methods are so identical as in two nations sprung from a common stem, a point to be remembered in considering an Anglo-Saxon combination.

The fact that it is in their strategical aspects that naval coali-

tions are to be feared is of especial importance in the case of a Power circumstanced as is the United States, with her Pacific and Atlantic fleets separated by the coast-line of a whole continent. In the disposition of her fleets the United States could not, under existing conditions, neglect to watch the actions of neutrals. An understanding with Great Britain would be of the utmost value in conferring strategic freedom, for it would enable the United States to apply the first principles of war and concentrate her fleets at the decisive points. Fortified by such an agreement, it ought not again to be necessary to send a telegram to an admiral, as was done to Admiral Sampson, saying: "The matter is left in your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked."

I am well aware of the ideal laid down by Washington that "the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible." In the Monroe declaration, the determination is expressed not to meddle with the internal affairs of other states; and in the Hague Convention the American representatives insisted on the traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in, the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state. The answer is obvious. The independence of the United States would not have been won in the eighteenth century if there had not been an alliance between the United States and European nations, and no subject has been so fruitful of diplomatic entanglement as the extension of commerce, with all the thorny questions of right of search, contraband of war and blockade. Thus the determination of Russia to prevent the opening of new consulates and treaty ports in Manchuria was directly aimed at the United States. The hostility of Germany has been obvious ever since the United States reaffirmed and amplified the Monroe Doctrine, and took an active interest in territorial affairs outside America, as at Samoa, for it should never be forgotten that, since the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1901, the United States has become an Empire as well as a Republic, peopled by subjects as well as citizens.

A different argument to that of Washington is that the United States is self-contained and her external relations are, therefore, of comparative unimportance. She does not, therefore, it is

argued, need a navy to enable her to win success in war. The answer was given by President Roosevelt, in 1902, when he said: "If the navy fails us, then we are doomed to defeat, no matter what may be our material wealth or the high average of our citizenship. It should, therefore, be an object of prime importance for every patriotic American to see that the navy is constantly built up and, above all, is kept at the highest point of efficiency both in *matériel* and in *personnel*." On the plea of self-containment, the Spanish war was a mistake, and the Monroe Doctrine and its recent amplifications are absurdities. To promulgate a law to guard the whole of America and the neutrality of the Panama Canal, and then to refuse to provide necessary police on the sea for these purposes, is to follow the Chinese system of make-believe. In the course of a message to Congress, President Roosevelt said: "We have deliberately made our own certain foreign policies demanding the possession of a first-class navy." He then showed that without an adequate navy the Isthmian canal would be merely a hostage to any stronger Power. The Monroe Doctrine, he declared, was an idle assertion unless the United States could back it by force of arms. "It can be backed up only by a thoroughly strong navy." To refuse the latter was "to invite trouble and, if trouble came, it would insure disaster." Captain Mahan has shown the probability of foreign complications in his "Lessons of the War with Spain":

"There is a large and growing German colony in southern Brazil, and I am credibly informed that there is a distinct effort to divert thither, by means direct or indirect, a considerable part of the emigration which now comes to the United States, and therefore is lost politically to Germany—for she has, of course, no prospect of colonization here. The inference is that the Emperor hopes at a future day, for which he is young enough to wait, to find in southern Brazil a strong German population, which in due time may seek to detach itself; and which may then seek political union with Germany, to obtain support against her former owners and masters. Without advancing any particular opinion as to the advisable geographical limits of the Monroe Doctrine, we may be pretty sure that the American people would resent an act which in our press would be called 'the aggression of a European military monarchy upon the political or territorial rights of an American republic.' This also could be accompanied with the liberal denunciation of William II. which now ornaments our editorial columns; but hard words break no bones, and the practical question would remain, 'What are you going to do about it,' with a navy 'for defence only?'"

In twelve years, the United States' naval expenditure has trebled, while that of Great Britain has doubled; and, in considering the American expenditure, a large proportion of the coming outlay on the Isthmian canal should be regarded as for the navy. Great Britain now annually spends on her navy during peace twice as much as the largest sum she ever devoted to that force during war, and the amount has been increasing at the rate of \$9,000,000 a year. These great increases have been brought about in both countries by a definite policy which aims at naval supremacy as against the other maritime Powers. It is such considerations which weighed considerably with the writer when, in association with a lifelong observer and one of the greatest of British naval authorities, Lord Brassey, he undertook a general review of the naval policy of the Powers for the "Encyclopædia Britannica." It was not possible in such a work to indicate a controversial solution which appeared both feasible and reasonable, viz., that the two nations should mutually guarantee each other against a possible alliance of three Powers, so that some limit might be set to the burden of their naval armaments. For, let no patriotic American delude himself into the belief that the present naval expenditure is any measure of what is yet to come. The ships built have to be manned, maintained and replaced. In Great Britain, the past naval programmes have averaged three battle-ships and five cruisers each year, and these will have to be replaced. In the United States the programme averaged about two battle-ships and two cruisers, while, owing to the difficulties of augmenting the navy, some of the ships now building are nearly three years overdue. In Great Britain it is the exception and not the rule for cruisers to last as much as twenty years, notwithstanding that the most expensive repairs are carried out. As for manning, the United States has only commenced to touch the fringe of the question of dealing with a *personnel* costing six times as much per head as that of the German navy. The report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in 1901 showed this clearly enough when he wrote:

"It has always been the policy of the Government to regard its regular establishment of the Navy and Army as a nucleus about which a larger establishment would be formed in case of war. The present establishment, however, can no longer be considered as an effective nucleus

for such a purpose. It barely sufficed for the Spanish war; and, were the fleet to be manned with full complements, as it would necessarily be if called upon to fight a first-class European Power, the present *personnel* would barely form one-fourth of the total establishment."

Such a state of affairs is little short of disastrous, for at least one European Power, Germany, is fully alive to the necessity of of a trained naval *personnel* in these days of complicated war vessels.

In 1878, Mr. Gladstone was able to declare that "the strength of England is not to be found in alliances with great military Powers, but it is to be found henceforth in the efficiency and supremacy of her navy—a navy as powerful now as the navies of all Europe." Naval supremacy is, however, based on economic supremacy. Gladstone spoke in a day when Great Britain's economic predominance was uncontested. He urged the necessity for great economy in order to reduce the national debt before the cheap supplies of coal, to which he traced the wealth of Britain, should begin to give out. The total naval expenditure of Great Britain has now risen to over \$200,000,000 a year, and the Admiralty have been authoritatively informed that the limit has been reached. In the desire to maintain her policy of avoiding entanglements with the military nations of Europe, it is natural that she should turn to her own kith and kin. The Colonies are not developed enough to help her to the extent of much more than the present one per cent. of her naval outlay; and even so, American capital must play an important part in bringing them to the state of full-grown nations. It is to the westward that the brightest eyes in Great Britain are turning to look for the expected reinforcements. The Prime Minister and the leaders of both parties in the House of Lords, July 27th, 1900, all expressed the view that never in the history of Great Britain has there been such an extraordinary antipathy for her as then existed among the peoples of Europe. Like a storm it arose, and the governments of Europe kept it in check because Great Britain's real foreign minister, a strong navy, was on guard. The lesson was a striking exemplification of the advice De Tocqueville gave to the United States, when he wrote that "experience proves no commercial prosperity can be durable if it cannot be united, in case of need, to naval force." Solon said much the same thing to Croesus, in pointing out that if another came whose iron was

the stronger he would take away all the gold. But if the iron itself is so costly as to cause the gold to dwindle, then Croesus must look round for others to share the burden.

The United States is approaching a similar problem. Solon, if he had lived to-day, would have declared that nations struggle both with gold and with iron, and the ceaseless industrial strife is becoming the more exacting of the two wars. Thus money abstracted from the pockets of the people for unproductive military purposes clearly cannot fructify in the industry of the people. In ten years, the expenditure of Great Britain has risen fifty per cent. If, then, there can be identity of interest on the part of the two Anglo-Saxon nations, who both glory in the costlier form of voluntary military service, and who differ from European nations in that they deny their Governments the means of raising revenue by the monopoly of railways, drink or tobacco, is it not possible for them to limit their expenditure by the guarantee of mutual assistance under certain circumstances?

America's path is beset by great dangers, and the disadvantages of waging war both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific are palpable. Cooperation between her fleets can at present only be effected by a transfer like the "Oregon's" famous voyage of 15,000 miles in fifty-nine days. Apparently, American expansion is even less acceptable to Europe than that of the British Empire, owing to the high protective tariff and monopoly of the coasting-trade favored by the United States. Both the Kaiser and the Czar are men in the prime of life, and both are penetrated with the doctrine of Divine Right contained in the declaration of the Monarchs of the Holy Alliance, May 12th, 1821, the words of which are worth recalling:

"Useful or necessary changes in legislation and in the administration of States ought only to emanate from the free will and the intelligent and well-weighed conviction of those whom God has rendered responsible for power. . . . Penetrated with this eternal truth, the Sovereigns have not hesitated to proclaim it with frankness and vigor; they have declared that, in respecting the rights and independence of all legitimate power, they regarded as legally null, and as disavowed by the principles which constitute the public right of Europe, all pretended reform operated by revolt and open hostility."

It was Canning who had to urge and insist that the United States was threatened by this declaration of the three monarchs,

and by the actions of France. The Monroe Doctrine, which was then promulgated, was aimed both at Russian ideas of sovereignty in America and at the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the Spanish colonies. In each case the United States was assured of the support of Great Britain, though she failed in attracting British adhesion to the view that future settlements could not be established, as in past times, in unoccupied territories. So far as material interests were at stake, it must be acknowledged that the ability to prevent joint European action in the Spanish colonies lay chiefly in the support of the British fleets, which, throughout the period when the Holy Alliance was plotting, numbered 131 to 145 battle-ships. Would not a similar cause prevent a like coalition from operating to-day? Briefly, my definite proposal is that the United States and Great Britain, having found that their policies are identical and that neither Power can be successfully attacked except from the sea, should jointly agree to come to each other's assistance in the event of either Power being threatened by a coalition of three maritime Powers. The nations under this heading are France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan. A special clause should exclude Japan until January 30th, 1908. The agreement should be terminable at three years' notice. While such an agreement does not constitute the open alliance once advocated in this REVIEW, it would undoubtedly be a desirable insurance, and would confer future benefit on both countries by arresting the growth of naval expenditure. The proposal is agreeable to the spirit of what Jefferson wrote in 1823:

"Great Britain is the nation that can do us most harm of any one, or all, on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her we should most sedulously nourish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause—not that I would purchase even her amity by taking part in her wars."

The concluding caution was needed in view of the policy of meddlesome interference once pursued by Great Britain in European affairs, a policy now happily recognized as impossible in the future. The above advice was given by the ex-President to President Monroe, when the latter consulted him as to the issue of the famous Doctrine, which, as Monroe stated in his letter to Jefferson, was only issued in America and not in England, in order

to prevent the irritation in Europe which such a step would cause because of "our union with her (Great Britain) being marked."

President Roosevelt in all his messages and speeches mentions only a war with one Power; but Jefferson, who knew European diplomacy well, saw clearly that the real danger lay in a combination of Powers. Thus President Roosevelt said in 1902:

"If we are not prepared to back up words by deeds, it is far better to omit the words. I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart. I believe in asserting it, because I believe the American people are willing to back it up. But it never can be backed up by words alone. If it became to the interest of some great Power to violate it, most assuredly that great Power would do so, if it thought that we could only bluster and threaten, or if it was believed our force was too weak to be formidable in a fight. A good navy is absolutely essential, if we intend to treat the Monroe Doctrine as we should treat it, that is, as the cardinal feature of our foreign policy."

If now we substitute the word "Powers" for "Power," we see how stupendous would be the task before the United States with her fleets so widely separated by the coast-line of a continent. The solution lies now in British aid, as it did in 1823. Over twenty years before, Jefferson had written:

"The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence that is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."

The words are as true to-day concerning a combination of Powers, with Germany at their head, as they were in 1802 concerning France. It is not for show purposes that the German navy has expanded in fifty years from a single corvette and two gunboats to the present large and homogeneous fleet concentrated in one mass at its own home dockyards. Germany now has one-fourth of her population dependent on foreign food. The nation grows at a rate of seven millions in ten years. She sees that her sons are lost to her by emigration. Such colonies as she possesses offer no future careers, for their trade is only equal to the total cost of government. The temptation, therefore, to intrigue in Brazil, Syria and China is well-nigh irresistible; and in the future, as in 1898, America's difficulty will be Germany's opportunity. It was even as with France, in 1864, when Napoleon

III. hoped to found a new Empire in Mexico under cover of Maximilian's rule.

There is a strategy in diplomacy as well as in war which is known as the "double objective," and it is so called from the fact that, until the eve of striking the blow, little is known to the victim from which of two directions it will come. Napoleon played it off successfully up to a point, in connection with his schemes for the invasion of England. The Emperor William dangles Great Britain so persistently before his Parliament, when pleading for the navy, as to prompt the suspicion that the real objective may be America. The whole scheme falls to the ground if the United States and Great Britain are united. Now neither of the two nations can hope to command the sea, against the rest of the world, in all the coming years; and ominous protests, on the part of Democrats in America and a section of the Liberal party in Great Britain, against naval expenditure, are already being heard, in spite of the fact that several European navies reach their maximum expansion in 1908. The Titanic task which is beyond their powers singly might be borne with ease if they were partners. Alliance is dictated by common prudence, for the defeat of either Power on the sea would cause a grave financial crisis, and cut off producers from consumers in a great cotton, provision and cereal market. The monopoly of maritime war now belongs to seven Powers. If Great Britain and the United States mutually insure themselves against a war with three or more of the remaining five, the old game of coalitions will forever be stopped. The other Powers may be neglected, for either their geographical or their economical position is an absolute bar to any rivalry.

For the cost of one battle-ship of to-day Great Britain could have placed in line at the battle of the Nile twice as many as were actually present under Nelson. Hence to-day the vital difference is that the industrial factors, in furnishing the sinews of war, are controlling forces of the situation. The proposed alliance offers facilities to shipping along 61,000 miles of coast as compared with 13,000 for France and Germany, and another 18,000, mostly icebound, for Russia. The two countries consumed nearly 50,000,000 metric tons of iron, in 1902, as compared with less than 33,000,000 for France, Germany and Russia. They produced twenty-six million tons of pig-iron, as compared

with about thirteen million tons for the three nations, and over twenty-two million tons of steel as compared with nine million tons. They control the banking operations of the world. They have the complete monopoly of the smokeless-coal supply. No less than seventy-two per cent. of the world's coal-supply in 1903 was controlled by the two nations. The United States has the virtual monopoly of the cotton, and the British Empire of the world's wool, supply. While these and numerous other material advantages exist, there is increasing evidence of individuals having anticipated the Governments in the matter of partnerships. The Governments can stimulate these partnerships by extending the boons of cheap postage and telegraphy, and by facilitating the transfer of money and securities. Since 1815 the United Kingdom has sent nearly fifteen millions of her population into North America. No political question divides the United States and Great Britain. Indeed, the United States is now lending money to develop the British Empire and so hastening on the day when the burden of armaments may be still further distributed, for the Colonies will be able to contribute more than the present one per cent. of Great Britain's naval outlay.

My proposal for a limited alliance has been dealt with in this article as a business proposition. I have done so because in a good cause sentiment is an excess. At the proper time, in the stress of difficulties, the sailors of both countries, who are the frontier diplomatists, have used words such as those of Commodore Josiah Tattnall, and their English "Hurrahs" have rung out for each other in the teeth of the hurricane at Samoa. Those are hallowed memories, showing that separation only came to cement us closer together; closer than when we owed allegiance to one King and one Parliament, and our united navy wrested America from the domination of France and Spain. Therefore, I feel certain that when in need of each other the Anglo-Saxons will march together. So long, however, as prevention is better than cure, so long must it be true that the agreement which would have prevented a war is better than the assistance which averts a defeat.

CARLYON BELLAIRS.